The "Smooth Relations" Trap: Why the Biden Administration Must Adopt a Firm Realism Toward China

The presidential transition in Washington carries immense geostrategic significance, particularly as the United States re-evaluates its relationship with China. This complex file serves as a primary test for the policy architects of the incoming administration of Joseph R. Biden Jr., raising vital questions about how Washington should navigate Beijing’s ambitions to reshape the international order.

Between Structural Realism and the Illusion of Smooth Relations

Structural realism in international relations demonstrates that the rise of a revisionist power—such as China—fundamentally alters the global balance of power, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office. Beijing is attempting to exploit the transitional period by offering a formula to "reset" tensions stemming from the approach of the Donald Trump administration. The Chinese proposal relies on isolating core contentious issues—such as industrial espionage, state subsidies, human rights violations, and cybersecurity—in exchange for superficial cooperation on global challenges like climate change and public health.

This Chinese approach reflects a strategy of tactical inducement; its goal is to submerge critical security and economic disputes under the umbrella of "shared interests." This forces Washington into a zero-sum game where prioritizing a facade of stability amounts to strategic deference—sacrificing the long-term security and sovereign interests of the United States and its regional allies.

Evaluating the Previous Approach: Structural Gains vs. Operational Inconsistencies

The Trump administration's strategy succeeded in shattering the long-standing paradigms that governed U.S.-China relations for three decades. Its primary merit lay in shifting American foreign policy away from "strategic wishful thinking" toward a firm realism, explicitly defining China as a comprehensive strategic competitor.

However, that strategy suffered from key structural flaws:

 * The Absence of Multilateralism: Unilateral actions weakened the unified front with traditional allies across Europe and Asia.

 * Misaligned Negotiation Priorities: Over-indexing on the bilateral trade deficit came at the expense of building broader, institutionalized technological and security coalitions.

Concurrently, statements from incoming administration officials reveal methodological contradictions. While Joe Biden has identified Russia as the primary immediate threat to American national security, Vice President-elect Kamala Harris has signaled a broader awareness of the structural challenge China poses to U.S. institutional influence within international organizations.

The Australian Precedent: The Limits of Economic Coercion

China's conduct toward Australia provides an instructive case study on the mechanics of its strategic leverage. Beijing issued a list of demands to Canberra, conditioning the relief of punitive trade measures against Australian exports on Canberra’s silence regarding vital matters:

 * Human rights abuses in Xinjiang, as well as developments in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

 * Domestic scrutiny of Chinese Communist Party influence within Australian institutions.

 * Calls for an independent inquiry into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.

This tactic—a textbook example of coercive diplomacy—demonstrates that Beijing's pursuit of "smooth relations" does not imply mutual compromise. Instead, it demands that the counterpart accept rules defined entirely on Chinese terms. Any American softness toward this model will send a disheartening signal to Washington’s partners across the Indo-Pacific.

Re-examining the Obama Legacy: Lessons on Climate and Strategic Competition

A review of the approach taken by former National Security Advisor Susan Rice during the Obama administration highlights the risks of elevating climate cooperation above geostrategic competition. Previous attempts to soften national security terminology—such as discouraging the use of the term "competitor"—were interpreted in Beijing as tactical weakness, which it exploited to consolidate its footprint in the South China Sea and pressure Taiwan.

As Kurt Campbell, a leading Asian affairs official, noted, Beijing’s willingness to engage on climate policy is not a favor to the United States or the international community; it is driven by its own domestic interests regarding food, water, and environmental security. Consequently, the new administration must not trade away core security assets for Chinese cooperation that Beijing would pursue out of self-interest anyway.

The Path Forward: Managing Instability and Rebuilding Coalitions

Managing U.S.-China relations does not mean pursuing stability at any cost. Rather, it requires adjusting to the reality that structural instability will remain an inherent feature of global competition.

A sound strategy requires a calibrated, multilateral deterrence framework built on three pillars:

 * Institutionalizing Responsible Competition: Establishing guardrails to prevent direct conflict without yielding ground to Beijing's expansionist behavior.

 * Rebuilding Regional Alliances: Reassuring key partners—including Australia, Japan, India, and Singapore—that Washington will not compromise their security interests in exchange for superficial bilateral agreements with Beijing.

 * Safeguarding Technological Sovereignty: Securing supply chains for critical technologies and insulating key Western infrastructure from cyber espionage.

The success of the Biden administration will hinge on its ability to maintain a clear-eyed balance: leveraging both hard and soft power to deter Chinese assertiveness while avoiding the trap of "smooth relations"—a concept that ultimately serves as a cover for accommodating Beijing's strategic dominance.